Military
Let us start with a :thank you. Thank you to all the men
and women who serve in our armed forces. To subject oneself to the demon
of war is in itself an act of fidelity. To serve, as do those in the
military, to put oneself under a different obedience structure, a select
set of rules even as to your rights and the danger of combat, is a commendable
and patriotic act. All Americans should respect and honor that type
of commitment, even if they disagree with the application of some particular
military action.
And since World War II, the armed services and navy have been subject
to several changes in structure and mission. In fact, in some most recent
cases, to missions that they may not have been completely equipped and
trained for. Now there is again talk of restructuring, perhaps even
lightening, the forces we deploy across the globe. So far
I have not seen any particular plan, yet I have heard testimony on C-Span
from the Defense Dept. that they are creating one. I do not claim any
particular expertise in military matters, but as an American citizen
I have tried to keep up with at least the history of our military. It
is a long and mostly honorable one, yet subject, just as Intelligence,
to between-war cutbacks and attempts at fine tuning.
Call me old fashioned, but I prefer to look at what the military, and
any organization for that matter, is doing before I would go mucking
about trying to reform it according to some kind of ideal force structure.
I wonder, in this latest attempt at revamping, if the military itself
was ever asked what it thought it needed or should have in the future.
Perhaps even asked for a template of how it would take the steps, over
time, to reform itself and what it thought it might face in the future.
Seems we have thousand of man-years of command experience, as well as
logistic and operational experience in the present services and their
attendant war colleges. Perhaps the bulk of the decision about the future
should come out of those and not the ideas of some extra-military think
tank.
That said, I will now be completely inconsistent and present a few ideas
that have been floating around in my brain for the last twenty years.
I apologize to all in the services if this is as lame brained as some
of the other ideas they have been subjected to. And before I start,
I want to make known my own prejudices on the future conflicts we will
face. I think this is necessary for anyone to judge my, or anyone elses,
ideas of what to do with our armed forces. And my prejudice
is simple. In standard battlefield presence we are first rank. Our combined
arms make us among the most formidable forces on this planet. And in
the future, most of the actions, if not our wars, will be fought only
in initial standard battles of very limited time and effort. Most of
the possible enemy militaries will not be able to withstand continued
contact with ours for very long in the historical sense. However, the
aftermath of that standard battle or war, will have very
little relation to our main service structures. In other words, after
the smoke clears were going to have to be able to operate in ways
almost diametric to what we use in standard maneuver and assault warfare.
And we will have to transform immediately from combat to peacekeeping,
insurgency suppression and administration roles.
As much as thirty years ago, some were saying the era of technological
warfare was ending. Our most recent wars seem to have disproved this,
and there seems to be a tendency to substitute hi-tech and electronic
battlefields for troop strength and strategic density. I am afraid I
cannot agree with those ideas. I would leave it to the services, with
some exceptions, to decide if they feel comfortable with change in unit
strengths and numbers needed in actual conflict. What I would suggest
is some changes in structure, training and auxiliary units. Future war
in this world is likely to be nonstandard, irrational and irregular.
It will probably be in environments, either natural or synthesized,
which will greatly reduce in effectiveness large portions of our hi-tech
arms and surveillance capabilities. It will also be discontinuous in
time, space and objectives. In some sense we are entering an era of
war similar in scope of change to that the British entered when they
took us on as colonial rebels. And it will also be one where our hi-tech
equipment cannot be depended upon to give us continuous supremacy..
Our enemies, both present and future, are not idiots. Why take on a
vastly superior armed force on terrain they can monopolize and in the
manner they are masters of? Through all history, when forces of vastly
unequal ability met, the successful underdogs have adjusted
their combat as best they could to neutralize the superiority. And often
the superior force was stymied or even defeated by the supposed
inferior. Only in the hands of a master commander, like Alexander, was
each and every irregular maneuver matched by creative reforming of force
structure and tactics. And in his case there are lessons for even modern
warriors. Alexander was in complete charge of his army, he was leader,
financier and trainer. It was also one of the most familial and socially
coherent armies in history, with brothers, cousins, sons and long term
comrades, making up at first the army itself, and later, as he added
Asian units, the commanders of those units. No matter how we stretch
the modern idea of a volunteer force, we cannot reach that level of
cohesiveness. There may, however, be some ways to approach that ideal.
That leads to my first idea. And it is based very loosely on the concept
of auxiliaries that were often used in ancient armies. In military history,
these might be, light cavalry, slingers, skirmishers and even bow men.
They served to do the jobs that the main force, often heavy infantry,
were not well equipped to do. They were able to screen, intercept, harass
and threaten the enemy, while the main force operated like a nucleus
of an atom with the auxiliaries as a cloud of electrons
forming an armed field about them. Today such a concept
would add unneeded expense, bulk and logistics to our forces. But what
if we were able to make a part of the regular force into such special
auxiliaries whenever we needed them?
Special forces of various kinds have been part of our military since
day one. In the Revolutionary War, we fielded true irregulars, like
Marion, specialists like the Green River Rifles, and even an entire
fresh water fleet to patrol the Great Lakes. Often the men who operated
in these units were regulars who transferred in from other
units, like Light Horse Harry Lee, who teamed up with the Swamp Fox.
And if we reversed the concept, in other words trained regulars in
place to perform special duties, then we would have the versatility
of the past with the capabilities of the future.
Today we do something similar to this idea, yet not fully enough realized.
Within many units and fleets, we have special training, like transport
or communication, or specially trained units, like armor or destroyers.
It might be an idea to train some members of all units as a minor version
of Special Forces cross-trained teams. Most of the times, especially
in standard combat, such teams would simply operate along with their
units. If, however, special irregular actions were needed to be taken,
they would be the section to carry them out. And if a larger special
mission was needed, one requiring truly specialized forces, they could
be a liaison team and backup for the special-op teams. They might even
be armed in a slightly different manner and with slightly augmented
equipment. In standard combat that would simply give them more firepower
or capability, and then in special situations they would be capable
of independent operations regular units could not easily carry out.
If we had fully one-tenth of our total forces trained in this way, not
including the already existing special units, we would multiply the
effectiveness of our forces by perhaps an order of magnitude.
In World War II, the Germans did something similar with their SS troops.
The problems with that were, besides the obvious criminal ones, they
were not mixable with regular troops and were often envied
or detested by them because they were treated special. They were generally,
however, very able units, and their special training and equipment made
them formidable opponents. Instead of repeating past mistakes, can we
not simply train within regular units select groups which
are capable of a greater range of operations. They would stay within
the familial structure of the unit, thus being of greater than average
use to their buddies, and allow any unit to begin special ops immediately,
without waiting for outside help. In fact, if one-tenth of every unit
were trained like that, it would mean an armed force could instantly
create special units, in place, equivalent to one-tenth
its strength. Or create an entire special force unit at one-tenth the
entire forces size. And with the cross-training model, it would
give any force internally much more medical, communications and specialty
training than it has now.
And the idea does not stop there. Present and future battlefields will,
I believe, be far more chaotic and varied than we see even now. For
decades now there have been efforts to bring electronic measures, surveillance
and non-human technology to that future battlefield. And these efforts
have been everything from the predator-style drones, to small battle
vehicles, to even robot insects. We may have neglected resources, used
in two World Wars and Korea and Vietnam, which served us well and even
today aids law enforcement. These are animal units, canine, avian and
sea mammals. And I do not mean as animal-mines, sacrificing
themselves because we are looking for an easy out to detection and pursuit.
No, I mean actual combat auxiliaries, who may also carry the advanced
technology weve been trying to put on mechanical treads and wheels
and wings.
The advantages should be obvious. Anyone who has seen a dog immobilize
a felon, knows we dont need robots to do it. And if one has watched
the hours of hovering of a condor or the incredible speed of the dolphin,
then they would conclude it was better to load electronics on those
than try to recreate such systems in plastic and steel. An armored,
sensored and naturally capable animal adjunct to the military seems
to me to be inevitable. They are not $250,000 per unit, as some drones
are, and they are self-repairing, convivial to the persons who they
are trained by and with, intelligent beyond present computers, equipped
with senses beyond most technology and have basic spirit, loyalty and
drive no machine can match.
There would probably not have to be many per unit, their sensory capabilities
are of such range and sensitivity that one could guard large areas.
They would introduce an immediate effect in terms of morale and combat
capability. Imagine having an animal who knows the scent
of every man in your unit, able to search him out, even in rubble, and
aids in leaving noone behind. Imagine the enemy, no matter how quiet,
never being able to sneak up on you, never being able to evade pursuit
or fool you into pursuing wrong trails. Imagine combined arms
of animals, ground and avian, being the guardians and directors of your
units. Then enhance that picture further. Equip them with advanced electronic
sensors and communication capabilities. Expand their already awesome
senses by creating a net of the information they send back. Electronic
battlefield like never before. And most importantly, give them combat
longevity by equipping them with personal armor.
Such an addition to the military picture creates incredible capability.
It also allows more mission possibilities, especially if combined with
the special training option mentioned above. You have now fielded a
force that has never been seen in this world. You have saved millions
of dollars by short-circuiting research on battle mobile mini-vehicles,
and added an incredible range and flexibility to every unit in your
service. From past experience, to activate the beginnings of such a
human/animal combined force, should be only a few years, with perhaps
test units fielded within two years. It allows time for hi-tech to catch
up with the present battlefield situation, and gives our forces
singular standing in combat. Plus, if combined with present technology,
like stationary cameras, hovering surveillance, not to mention satellite
and spy plane, it creates that sought after electronic battlefield with
more real world information and feedback. At the same time it can operate
under failure mode of the electronics and display loyalty and cohesion
we can never expect from mechanics.
These two concepts are perhaps worthy of consideration. When I think
of the fire-effect of a Seal or Special Forces team, I cannot help thinking
that such capability needs to be more widespread in our forces. Plus
the self-contained capability that such teams bring with them to battle.
They are their own medics, communication experts and weapons masters.
Those abilities also need to be more widely available in our structures.
And when I think of the natural, evolution honed, abilities of several
animals used since ancient times in battle, I almost cannot conceive
how we have so far avoided pressing them into service again. Such as
the dog and the hawk, have worked side by side with humans for millennia.
Yet even today, when we have the funding and ability to integrate them
into our services, we have largely ignored them. If we are truly to
innovate then sometimes we must look behind us, remembering the images
of the mongrel who tagged along to school, and pulled us out of the
swimming hole the day we played hooky, and almost drowned. Or the cat
who in nights deepest hours, woke us to fire and what should have
been certain death. To the sparrow, whose sudden flight from the road,
tensed us enough so we were ready to spring aside as the truck rounded
the curve. All of us have experienced such wonders of animal senses,
should we not at least try them now to aid us. And allow an ancient
cooperation help us bring peace through their strengths and our own?
One final thought. Today and tomorrow, the military will need either
far better global information than it has or have its own environmental
information units embedded in the force structure. Situational climate
and geophysical changes, as well as undreamed of circumstances, are
likely to be critical on the battlefield. Presently we depend on extra-unit
sources for that data. Conflict is now, as in the case of Iraqi oil
fires, and will be moreso in the future, an adjunct of, and dependent
upon, environmental factors. Even the operation of the sensor and intelligence
components of the military, will be dependent upon such factors. Either
through natural or purposeful actions, environment will affect those
components.
And simply having the unit capability will not be enough. We will also
need to form a net from the individual units data in order to form an
operational map of the entire theater. Such nets, in this
area, and in all other areas, will be necessity in battle. It is perhaps
this, a resource that allows us to learn about the battlefield,
rather than an electronic battlefield, that we should be
looking at. In one we create an electronic map, then decide based upon
that. In the other we create an information map, without locking in
or out any of the components. In both cases we must remember the map
is not the territory, and that admonition is a magnitude greater in
the electronic map than in the informational one. That is the danger
in such electronic mapping, it provides only positional, force (our
own), biometrics and movement and direction data. The informational
mapping begins at that, then weaves in many more factors. In detail
the info-map is less clear, the tron-map more concise. In use and decision,
however, the info-map gives far greater latitude and extension than
the other. It is chess versus a transfinite game of Go. I certainly
dont know how to bring the info-map into being, nor how to use
it to perfection, but I do believe we will need it, and environment
is only one part of it, much more will be needed that I cannot conceive.
Perhaps we are entering an era of conflict where we will have to develop
for units and force structure the equivalent of the ancient art of combat
Zen. An era when we will have to produce cohesive unit response akin
to the psycho physical abilities of the Shaolin or the Ronin.
Every war in history has probably seen such ability. From the combat
and logistic brilliance of Alexander, to the creativity of Demetrius
the Besieger, to Napoleon in his heyday, to Rommel and Patton and the
officer who had his men point weapons to the ground and adopt non-threatening
stances in this last Iraq war. That is the spirit of what is coming.
It cannot, and should not, be defined by mere electronic maps and instant
feedback. Without the added component, and I do not know what to call
it, that map will simply be our epithet chiseled on our tombstone. In
military matters, as in all areas of human endeavor, we are going to
have to decide to make it into kindergarten, we have been preschool
too long already.
We must go beyond the World War II concept of auftragstaktik and instill
at operational and unit levels something more. If we do not, then we
will repeat such situations as that we are in with Iraq. Many units
are holed up and depending on an Iraqi government which
depends on militias and warlords for its support. Yet, neither it nor
we, understand how to instill in those instruments the necessary added
component which will allow them to become a true national force. The
mistakes made in our planning, perception and execution of the present
conflict, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unadmitted, perhaps not
even realized. And if we cannot see an error, we have almost zero chance
of correcting it. And only luck or chance can exit us from our present
predicament.
I started this theme with a thank you to our forces. Perhaps
it should be ended with an appeal to those same forces, to find ways
to make known their needs, instincts and wishes. War is not, I believe,
the purpose of the military. Yes it must be able and ready to fight,
yet winning without conflict is far more effective. Sparta probably
defeated far more threats by reputation and readiness than
by actual battle. And those who chose to ignore their ability and competence,
learned to rue that decision. We can be in a similar position, especially
with our obvious advantages in battle-tech and total military and extra-military
capability. The fact that we are not, indicates we are missing something.
I am not learned enough in such matters to point to what it is, but
as a citizen, I am just smart enough to notice that something is missing.
I hope we make the effort to find and correct the deficiency. A true
effort, not one of ideology and polemic. I pray we can find such a way
to use what has been forged over so many generations. If we do not,
I fear there will be no second chance. We and Humanity are about to
enter a testing phase. There are apparently no grades except pass or
fail.
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