Let us start with a :”thank you.” Thank you to all the men and women who serve in our armed forces. To subject oneself to the demon of war is in itself an act of fidelity. To serve, as do those in the military, to put oneself under a different obedience structure, a select set of rules even as to your rights and the danger of combat, is a commendable and patriotic act. All Americans should respect and honor that type of commitment, even if they disagree with the application of some particular military action.

And since World War II, the armed services and navy have been subject to several changes in structure and mission. In fact, in some most recent cases, to missions that they may not have been completely equipped and trained for. Now there is again talk of restructuring, perhaps even “lightening,” the forces we deploy across the globe. So far I have not seen any particular plan, yet I have heard testimony on C-Span from the Defense Dept. that they are creating one. I do not claim any particular expertise in military matters, but as an American citizen I have tried to keep up with at least the history of our military. It is a long and mostly honorable one, yet subject, just as Intelligence, to between-war cutbacks and attempts at “fine tuning.”

Call me old fashioned, but I prefer to look at what the military, and any organization for that matter, is doing before I would go mucking about trying to reform it according to some kind of ideal force structure. I wonder, in this latest attempt at revamping, if the military itself was ever asked what it thought it needed or should have in the future. Perhaps even asked for a template of how it would take the steps, over time, to reform itself and what it thought it might face in the future. Seems we have thousand of man-years of command experience, as well as logistic and operational experience in the present services and their attendant war colleges. Perhaps the bulk of the decision about the future should come out of those and not the ideas of some extra-military think tank.

That said, I will now be completely inconsistent and present a few ideas that have been floating around in my brain for the last twenty years. I apologize to all in the services if this is as lame brained as some of the other ideas they have been subjected to. And before I start, I want to make known my own prejudices on the future conflicts we will face. I think this is necessary for anyone to judge my, or anyone else’s, ideas of what to “do” with our armed forces. And my prejudice is simple. In standard battlefield presence we are first rank. Our combined arms make us among the most formidable forces on this planet. And in the future, most of the actions, if not our wars, will be fought only in initial standard battles of very limited time and effort. Most of the possible enemy militaries will not be able to withstand continued contact with ours for very long in the historical sense. However, the aftermath of that “standard” battle or war, will have very little relation to our main service structures. In other words, after the smoke clears we’re going to have to be able to operate in ways almost diametric to what we use in standard maneuver and assault warfare. And we will have to transform immediately from combat to peacekeeping, insurgency suppression and administration roles.

As much as thirty years ago, some were saying the era of technological warfare was ending. Our most recent wars seem to have disproved this, and there seems to be a tendency to substitute hi-tech and electronic battlefields for troop strength and strategic density. I am afraid I cannot agree with those ideas. I would leave it to the services, with some exceptions, to decide if they feel comfortable with change in unit strengths and numbers needed in actual conflict. What I would suggest is some changes in structure, training and auxiliary units. Future war in this world is likely to be nonstandard, irrational and irregular. It will probably be in environments, either natural or synthesized, which will greatly reduce in effectiveness large portions of our hi-tech arms and surveillance capabilities. It will also be discontinuous in time, space and objectives. In some sense we are entering an era of war similar in scope of change to that the British entered when they took us on as colonial rebels. And it will also be one where our hi-tech equipment cannot be depended upon to give us continuous supremacy..

Our enemies, both present and future, are not idiots. Why take on a vastly superior armed force on terrain they can monopolize and in the manner they are masters of? Through all history, when forces of vastly unequal ability met, the successful “underdogs” have adjusted their combat as best they could to neutralize the superiority. And often the “superior” force was stymied or even defeated by the supposed inferior. Only in the hands of a master commander, like Alexander, was each and every irregular maneuver matched by creative reforming of force structure and tactics. And in his case there are lessons for even modern warriors. Alexander was in complete charge of his army, he was leader, financier and trainer. It was also one of the most familial and socially coherent armies in history, with brothers, cousins, sons and long term comrades, making up at first the army itself, and later, as he added Asian units, the commanders of those units. No matter how we stretch the modern idea of a volunteer force, we cannot reach that level of cohesiveness. There may, however, be some ways to approach that ideal.

That leads to my first idea. And it is based very loosely on the concept of auxiliaries that were often used in ancient armies. In military history, these might be, light cavalry, slingers, skirmishers and even bow men. They served to do the jobs that the main force, often heavy infantry, were not well equipped to do. They were able to screen, intercept, harass and threaten the enemy, while the main force operated like a nucleus of an atom with the auxiliaries as a cloud of “electrons” forming an armed “field” about them. Today such a concept would add unneeded expense, bulk and logistics to our forces. But what if we were able to make a part of the regular force into such special auxiliaries whenever we needed them?
Special forces of various kinds have been part of our military since day one. In the Revolutionary War, we fielded true irregulars, like Marion, specialists like the Green River Rifles, and even an entire fresh water fleet to patrol the Great Lakes. Often the men who operated in these units were regulars who “transferred in” from other units, like Light Horse Harry Lee, who teamed up with the Swamp Fox. And if we reversed the concept, in other words trained regulars “in place” to perform special duties, then we would have the versatility of the past with the capabilities of the future.

Today we do something similar to this idea, yet not fully enough realized. Within many units and fleets, we have special training, like transport or communication, or specially trained units, like armor or destroyers. It might be an idea to train some members of all units as a minor version of Special Forces cross-trained teams. Most of the times, especially in standard combat, such teams would simply operate along with their units. If, however, special irregular actions were needed to be taken, they would be the section to carry them out. And if a larger special mission was needed, one requiring truly specialized forces, they could be a liaison team and backup for the special-op teams. They might even be armed in a slightly different manner and with slightly augmented equipment. In standard combat that would simply give them more firepower or capability, and then in special situations they would be capable of independent operations regular units could not easily carry out. If we had fully one-tenth of our total forces trained in this way, not including the already existing special units, we would multiply the effectiveness of our forces by perhaps an order of magnitude.

In World War II, the Germans did something similar with their SS troops. The problems with that were, besides the obvious criminal ones, they were not “mixable” with regular troops and were often envied or detested by them because they were treated special. They were generally, however, very able units, and their special training and equipment made them formidable opponents. Instead of repeating past mistakes, can we not simply “train within” regular units select groups which are capable of a greater range of operations. They would stay within the familial structure of the unit, thus being of greater than average use to their buddies, and allow any unit to begin special ops immediately, without waiting for outside help. In fact, if one-tenth of every unit were trained like that, it would mean an armed force could instantly “create” special units, in place, equivalent to one-tenth its strength. Or create an entire special force unit at one-tenth the entire force’s size. And with the cross-training model, it would give any force internally much more medical, communications and specialty training than it has now.

And the idea does not stop there. Present and future battlefields will, I believe, be far more chaotic and varied than we see even now. For decades now there have been efforts to bring electronic measures, surveillance and non-human technology to that future battlefield. And these efforts have been everything from the predator-style drones, to small battle vehicles, to even robot insects. We may have neglected resources, used in two World Wars and Korea and Vietnam, which served us well and even today aids law enforcement. These are animal units, canine, avian and sea mammals. And I do not mean as “animal-mines,” sacrificing themselves because we are looking for an easy out to detection and pursuit. No, I mean actual combat auxiliaries, who may also carry the advanced technology we’ve been trying to put on mechanical treads and wheels and wings.

The advantages should be obvious. Anyone who has seen a dog immobilize a felon, knows we don’t need robots to do it. And if one has watched the hours of hovering of a condor or the incredible speed of the dolphin, then they would conclude it was better to load electronics on those than try to recreate such systems in plastic and steel. An armored, sensored and naturally capable animal adjunct to the military seems to me to be inevitable. They are not $250,000 per unit, as some drones are, and they are self-repairing, convivial to the persons who they are trained by and with, intelligent beyond present computers, equipped with senses beyond most technology and have basic spirit, loyalty and drive no machine can match.

There would probably not have to be many per unit, their sensory capabilities are of such range and sensitivity that one could guard large areas. They would introduce an immediate effect in terms of morale and combat capability. Imagine having an animal who “knows” the scent of every man in your unit, able to search him out, even in rubble, and aids in leaving noone behind. Imagine the enemy, no matter how quiet, never being able to sneak up on you, never being able to evade pursuit or fool you into pursuing wrong trails. Imagine “combined arms” of animals, ground and avian, being the guardians and directors of your units. Then enhance that picture further. Equip them with advanced electronic sensors and communication capabilities. Expand their already awesome senses by creating a net of the information they send back. Electronic battlefield like never before. And most importantly, give them combat longevity by equipping them with personal armor.

Such an addition to the military picture creates incredible capability. It also allows more mission possibilities, especially if combined with the special training option mentioned above. You have now fielded a force that has never been seen in this world. You have saved millions of dollars by short-circuiting research on battle mobile mini-vehicles, and added an incredible range and flexibility to every unit in your service. From past experience, to activate the beginnings of such a human/animal combined force, should be only a few years, with perhaps test units fielded within two years. It allows time for hi-tech to “catch up” with the present battlefield situation, and gives our forces singular standing in combat. Plus, if combined with present technology, like stationary cameras, hovering surveillance, not to mention satellite and spy plane, it creates that sought after electronic battlefield with more real world information and feedback. At the same time it can operate under failure mode of the electronics and display loyalty and cohesion we can never expect from mechanics.

These two concepts are perhaps worthy of consideration. When I think of the fire-effect of a Seal or Special Forces team, I cannot help thinking that such capability needs to be more widespread in our forces. Plus the self-contained capability that such teams bring with them to battle. They are their own medics, communication experts and weapons masters. Those abilities also need to be more widely available in our structures. And when I think of the natural, evolution honed, abilities of several animals used since ancient times in battle, I almost cannot conceive how we have so far avoided pressing them into service again. Such as the dog and the hawk, have worked side by side with humans for millennia. Yet even today, when we have the funding and ability to integrate them into our services, we have largely ignored them. If we are truly to innovate then sometimes we must look behind us, remembering the images of the mongrel who tagged along to school, and pulled us out of the swimming hole the day we played hooky, and almost drowned. Or the cat who in night’s deepest hours, woke us to fire and what should have been certain death. To the sparrow, whose sudden flight from the road, tensed us enough so we were ready to spring aside as the truck rounded the curve. All of us have experienced such wonders of animal senses, should we not at least try them now to aid us. And allow an ancient cooperation help us bring peace through their strengths and our own?

One final thought. Today and tomorrow, the military will need either far better global information than it has or have its own environmental information units embedded in the force structure. Situational climate and geophysical changes, as well as undreamed of circumstances, are likely to be critical on the battlefield. Presently we depend on extra-unit sources for that data. Conflict is now, as in the case of Iraqi oil fires, and will be moreso in the future, an adjunct of, and dependent upon, environmental factors. Even the operation of the sensor and intelligence components of the military, will be dependent upon such factors. Either through natural or purposeful actions, environment will affect those components.
And simply having the unit capability will not be enough. We will also need to form a net from the individual units data in order to form an operational “map” of the entire theater. Such nets, in this area, and in all other areas, will be necessity in battle. It is perhaps this, a resource that allows us to “learn” about the battlefield, rather than an “electronic battlefield,” that we should be looking at. In one we create an electronic map, then decide based upon that. In the other we create an information map, without locking in or out any of the components. In both cases we must remember the map is not the territory, and that admonition is a magnitude greater in the electronic map than in the informational one. That is the danger in such electronic mapping, it provides only positional, force (our own), biometrics and movement and direction data. The informational mapping begins at that, then weaves in many more factors. In detail the info-map is less clear, the tron-map more concise. In use and decision, however, the info-map gives far greater latitude and extension than the other. It is chess versus a transfinite game of Go. I certainly don’t know how to bring the info-map into being, nor how to use it to perfection, but I do believe we will need it, and environment is only one part of it, much more will be needed that I cannot conceive. Perhaps we are entering an era of conflict where we will have to develop for units and force structure the equivalent of the ancient art of combat Zen. An era when we will have to produce cohesive unit response akin to the psycho physical abilities of the Shaolin or the Ronin.

Every war in history has probably seen such ability. From the combat and logistic brilliance of Alexander, to the creativity of Demetrius the Besieger, to Napoleon in his heyday, to Rommel and Patton and the officer who had his men point weapons to the ground and adopt non-threatening stances in this last Iraq war. That is the spirit of what is coming. It cannot, and should not, be defined by mere electronic maps and instant feedback. Without the added component, and I do not know what to call it, that map will simply be our epithet chiseled on our tombstone. In military matters, as in all areas of human endeavor, we are going to have to decide to make it into kindergarten, we have been preschool too long already.
We must go beyond the World War II concept of auftragstaktik and instill at operational and unit levels something more. If we do not, then we will repeat such situations as that we are in with Iraq. Many units are “holed up” and depending on an Iraqi government which depends on militias and warlords for its support. Yet, neither it nor we, understand how to instill in those instruments the necessary added component which will allow them to become a true national force. The mistakes made in our planning, perception and execution of the present conflict, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, are unadmitted, perhaps not even realized. And if we cannot see an error, we have almost zero chance of correcting it. And only luck or chance can exit us from our present predicament.

I started this theme with a “thank you” to our forces. Perhaps it should be ended with an appeal to those same forces, to find ways to make known their needs, instincts and wishes. War is not, I believe, the purpose of the military. Yes it must be able and ready to fight, yet winning without conflict is far more effective. Sparta probably “defeated” far more threats by reputation and readiness than by actual battle. And those who chose to ignore their ability and competence, learned to rue that decision. We can be in a similar position, especially with our obvious advantages in battle-tech and total military and extra-military capability. The fact that we are not, indicates we are missing something. I am not learned enough in such matters to point to what it is, but as a citizen, I am just smart enough to notice that something is “missing.” I hope we make the effort to find and correct the deficiency. A true effort, not one of ideology and polemic. I pray we can find such a way to use what has been forged over so many generations. If we do not, I fear there will be no second chance. We and Humanity are about to enter a testing phase. There are apparently no grades except pass or fail.